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Political Asylum for the Haitians?
by Michael C.P. Ryan'
I. INTRODUCTION
P erhaps thirty thousand Haitians have flocked to the shores of
South Florida during the past twenty years.1 Since January 1980, Hai-
tian nationals have been arriving at the rate of more than 1,000 per
month.2 Very few of these individuals have been granted permission to
remain in the United States.3 Thus, in recent years, a significant amount
of litigation in federal courts has concerned attempts by Haitian aliens to
obtain political asylum.
The recent district court decision, Haitian Refugee Center v. Civi-
letti,4 held that the processing of Haitian asylum claims by the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS) deprived the petitioners of due
process of law, and constituted unlawful discrimination on the basis of
national origin.5 In so holding, the court examined a tremendous amount
of evidence concerning conditions in Haiti.6 The reported opinion, which
* J.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School (1982).
See Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 450 (S.D. Fla. 1980), appeal
docketed, No. 80-5683 (5th Cir. Sept. 2, 1980)[hereinafter cited as Haitian Refugee Center];
see also, Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees
and International Law, House Comm. on Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 325 (1979)(state-
ment of Virginia Dominquez).
2 N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1981, at 1, col. 5.
3 Precise figures as to the number of claims granted are not available. See, 1979 IMMI-
GRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ANN. REP. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
reported that between 1972 and March 1979 the Department of State issued positive recom-
mendations of asylum in only 240 cases. See, In re Williams, 16 I. & N. Dec. 697, 703 (1979).
Haitian Refugee Center was a class action by over 5,000 plaintiffs, all of whom had had
their asylum claims denied.
" 503 F. Supp. 442.
5 Id. at 511.
' The Government's appeal brief notes that the case produced a 29 volume record, a 3
volume supplemental record on appeal, a 2 volume appendix, and a 14 volume trial tran-
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covers over one hundred pages, includes an exhaustive review of the
power structure, legal systems, political climate, and prevailing social and
economic conditions in Haiti.
These findings are relevant, however, only in the context of plaintiff's
challenges to the Haitian Program, since the court was not reviewing the
action of the INS with respect to any particular individual.1 The plaintiff-
appellees acknowledged this in their appeals brief stating:
It [the court] did not decide any of the asylum claims involved in the
case. Instead, the court focused on the manner in which the agency had
considered these claims, and concluded that the procedures were defec-
tive. The court did not grant or deny asylum to anyone, but only ordered
the INS District Director to reprocess all plaintiffrs asylum applications
in accordance with a plan to be submitted by INS .... 8
Since Haitian Refugee Center is limited in this respect, the question
of what materials may properly be accepted into evidence by the official
considering an individual asylum application remains unanswered.
In order to determine how much of the Haitian Refugee Center dis-
cussion of general conditions in the applicant's home nation is relevant in
making an asylum decision, it is necessary: 1) to understand the statutory
framework established for processing the asylum claim of an alien subject
to deportation proceedings; 9 2) to examine the case law relevant to this
framework; and 3) to consider the standard of appellate review of individ-
ual asylum claims. Only after these topics are analyzed can conclusions be
drawn about the usefulness of Haitian Refugee Center in future adjudica-
tion of asylum claims at the INS level.
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
An alien who enters the United States without presenting himself to
an Immigration Officer is deportable under the Immigration and Nation-
script. Brief for Appellants at 3 n.1.
I Plaintiffs alleged, and the district court found, the program was established by the
INS to facilitate the rapid process of deportation proceedings involving Haitian asylum
claims. 503 F. Supp. at 510.
8 Brief for Appellees at 39 (emphasis in the original).
9 This paper does not specifically address the issue of claims by aliens not subject to
deportation proceedings. An alien may seek asylum and the claim will be processed as a
request for relief under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1101 et seq. (1976)
as amended by Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.A. §1101 et seq.)(West Supp. 1981). Asylum may be granted in the dis-
cretion of the Attorney General. Id. at §1158 (West Supp. 1981) (emphasis added).
The status of a political asylum claim by an alien in an exclusion proceeding is unclear.
See Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated & remanded for consid-
eration of mootness, 434 U.S. 962 (1977).
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ality Act (INA) section 241(a)(2).20 Once the deportation process has been
initiated by the issuance of a cause order, a request for political asylum is
treated as a request for withholding of deportation under section 243(h)
of the INA." To better understand the necessary elements of a successful
political asylum claim, the legislative history of section 243(h) must be
examined.
Section 243(h) was first enacted in section 23 of the Internal Security
Act of 1950, which provided: "No alien shall be deported under any provi-
sion of this Act to any country in which the Attorney General shall find
that such alien would be subject to physical persecution."' 2 Three aspects
of this provision are noteable. First, the Attorney General was required to
suspend deportation; his was not a discretionary function. Second, the
burden of proof was on the alien. Third, proof of physical persecution
was required.
In 1952, a revised version of section 23 of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act" granted broad discretion to the Attorney General. The
burden of proving physical persecution, however, remained with the
alien."' The enacted provision read: "The Attorney General is authorized
to withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any
country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to physical
persecution and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for
such reasons."' 5
Although Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson
10 This section provides: "Any alien in the United States. . . shall, upon the order of
the Attorney General, be deported who-entered the United States without inspection or at
any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General .... " 8 U.S.C.
§1251(a)(2) (1976).
1 8 U.S.C.A. §1253(h) (West Supp. 1981). This claim is treated as a request for the
benefits of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force, United States, Nov. 1,
1968)[hereinafter cited as Convention]. Articles 2 through 34 of the Convention, and a re-
vised Article 1, were made applicable to the United States via article 1 of the United Na-
tions Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (effective Nov. 1, 1968)[hereinafter cited as Protocol].
The applicability, if any, of the Convention and Protocol to the claims of the Haitian na-
tionals is beyond the scope of this note.
12 The Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, §23, 64 Stat. 987, 1010 (amending Immi-
gration Act of 1917, ch. 29 §20, 39 Stat. 874, 890-91)(Title I of the Internal Security Act of
1950 is commonly referred to as the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950).
13 Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
14 This burden was not insignificant given the tenor of the times. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Camezon v. District Director, 105 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). "It is apparent
that the amendment of Title 8 U.S.C.A. §156 by §23 of the Internal Security Act of 1950
was made with the internal security of the nation in mind and not with any solicitude for
the objectionable alien's welfare." Id. at 38.
1I Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, §243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952).
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voiced dissatisfaction with the stringent terms of the 1952 Act, 6 the INA
remained substantially intact until 1965.17
Amendments made in that year materially altered section 243(h) by
deleting the words "physical persecution" and substituting the phrase
"persecution on account of race, religion or political opinion."' 8 This sub-
stitution did not alter either the discretionary nature of the Attorney
General's function, or the alien's burden of proof. It is clear, however,
that by removing the adjective 'physical', Congress effectively broadened
the class of aliens qualifying for relief under section 243(h). Congressional
intent in making the change has been interpreted as an attempt to "shift
• . .the emphasis from the consequences of the oppressive conduct to the
motivation behind it."' 9
Two major interpretational problems have emerged since the 1965
amendments. First, without Congressional guidance, the meaning of 'per-
secution' has caused arduous debate. Some courts have interpreted it ac-
cording to its ordinary dictionary definition-"the infliction of suffering
or harm upon those who differ (in race, religion, or political opinion) in a
way regarded as offensive."20 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),
on the other hand, stated that Article 33 of the Protocol2 1 required a
"threat to life or freedom" to avoid expulsion.2 2 The dispute was resolved
with the Refugee Act of 1980, an amendment to section 243(h) in which
Congress adopted the BIA position by requiring the Attorney General to
make a finding "that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened"
before relief from deportation could be provided.2 3
The second interpretational problem concerns the alien's burden of
proof under the 1965 Amendments. One interpretation is that the
Amendments reduced an alien's burden from proving a "clear
probability" of persecution, to proving a "well founded fear." This argu-
'" See Note, Coriolan v. Immigration and Naturalization Service: A Closer Look at
Immigration Law and the Political Refugee, 6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 133, 154 (1978)
and sources cited therein.
1 See Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911.
18 Id. at §11(f).
19 Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969). When offering the language which
was eventually adopted, Congressman Poff stated: "The clause 'physical persecution' is en-
tirely too narrow. It is almost impossible for the alien under an order of deportation to
assemble the quantum of evidence necessary to discharge his burden of proof." 111 CONG.
REc. 21,804 (1965).
20 Kovac, 407 F.2d at 107 (citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary
(1965))(reaffirmed in Moghanian v. Dep't of Justice, 577 F.2d 141, 142 (9th Cir. 1978)).
' Protocol, supra note 11, at art. 33.
12 In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 320 (1973).
23 Pub. L. No. 96-212, §203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (codified at 8 U.S.C.A. §1253(h)(West
Supp. 1981)). The Refugee Act of 1980 is generally viewed as an attempt to bring the INA
more into harmony with the Geneva Convention.
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ment gained support when the United States ratified the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees.24 The Protocol defined a refugee as
one who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted. . . is outside
the country of his nationality .... ,,25 It also prohibited the expulsion or
return of a "refugee" whose "life or freedom would be threatened
... 28 The 1980 Refugee Act, in amending section 243(h), did not spe-
cifically address the issue of the alien's burden of proof,2 7 thus leaving
this issue unsettled.
The initial pronouncement by the BIA on this question was the 1973
decision, In re Dunar.28 The BIA established the requirement that the
alien show a "clear probability of persecution. '29 The Board argued that
the "well-founded fear" language in the Protocol made no alteration in
U.S. immigration law in this area.2 0 A number of cases have subsequently
upheld the "clear probability" standard in appeals involving the with-
holding of section 243(h) relief,3' although very few decisions have seri-
ously analyzed the issue to any great extent.32 The credibility of the BIA
argument was eroded, however, because the BIA opinions lacked con-
24 Protocol, supra note 11.
25 Protocol, supra note 11, at art. 1(2)(adopting the definition of refugee contained in
Article 1 of the Convention). The United States originally did not adhere to the Convention,
but substantially adopted it in the Protocol.
2" Protocol, supra note 11, at art. l(1)(adopting articles 2-34 of the Convention); Con-
vention, supra note 11, at art. 33 (prohibiting refoulement).
2' See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, §203(e), 94 Stat. 107, (codified at 8
U.S.C.A. §1253(h)(West Supp. 1981)); S. REP. 96-256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 141, 149-50.
The court in Haitian Refugee Center did not address this issue. It may become, how-
ever, a crucial issue in future asylum claims.
218 14 I. & N. Dec. 310.
'9 Id. at 318-19.
30 Id. at 314-18. The BIA employed recognized canons of construction to determine
whether the treaty repealed or modified pre-existing statutes. The Board relied on canons
such as the "purpose of the treaty [to do so] must appear clearly and distinctly" and "an
attempt must be made to give effect to both, if that can be done without violating the
language of either." Id. at 313.
21 See Brief for Appellants, at 59-60 and cases cited therein.
22 For example, the main authority in the appellants' brief on this point is Pierre v.
United States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1977). See Brief for Appellants' at 59-60 n.17. Pierre
is an exclusion proceeding appeal, thus the standard may be different, especially in view of
section 208(a) of the Refugee Act of 1980. One of the two authorities cited by the Pierre
court is Gena v. INS, 424 F.2d 227, 229-30 (5th Cir. 1979). The Gena decision never men-
tions a specific standard, but it does quote from the special inquiry officer's explanation of
denial of section 243(h) relief. The officer wrote: "I find [Gena] has failed to establish that
he would suffer or has reasonable ground to believe he would suffer persecution ...... Id. at
230. It appears that the "reasonable ground to believe" standard is more analogous to "well-
founded fear" than "clear probability." The "clear probability" standard, however, was re-
cently upheld in Martineau v. INS, 556 F.2d 306, 307 (5th Cir. 1977).
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tinuity. For example, in Dunar, the BIA vaguely determined the standard
was not a "merely conjectural possibility" but rather "a realistic likeli-
hood. '3 3 In a later case,34 the BIA cited Dunar for the proposition that an
alien has the "burden of proving probable persecution by a preponder-
ance of the evidence."3 5
In Coriolan v. INS"6 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals seized upon
the BIA's sloppy phraseology and held that aliens must show only a
"well-founded fear that their lives or freedom would be threatened."7 In
a footnote, the court stated that the decision in Dunar, and the BIA's
"subsequent use of the Protocol's terminology . . . suggest at least a
slight diminution in the alien's burden of proof before the Board."38 The
same court was later faced with a section 243(h) case where the Immigra-
tion Judge had again used the "well-founded fear" standard.3 9 Upholding
the deportation ruling of the lower court, the Fifth Circuit agreed that
the alien had not proven "probable political persecution."'40
Following the recent line of authorities, one might believe that in-
deed the alien's burden of proof had been lessened. In its latest pro-
nouncement on the subject, however, the BIA stated: "To meet his bur-
den of proof, an alien must demonstrate a clear probability that he will be
persecuted if returned to his country."41 This statement was made in the
context of overturning an Immigration Judge's decision, thereby refusing
section 243(h) relief. Thus, it appears that the INS will continue to re-
quire a higher threshold of alien proof-that a "clear probability" of a
"threat to life or freedom" exists-before relief will be granted.
Two further points should be made concerning the 1980 Refugee Act
amendment to section 243(h). First, the section still requires the Attorney
General to withhold deporting an alien if the given conditions are met.4 2
33 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 319.
Williams, 16 I. & N. Dec. 697.
s' Id. at 700.
3' 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977).
s Id. at 997-98.
38 Id. at 997 n.8.
" Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1978). Other cases have upheld the
"well-founded fear" standard. See, e.g., Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975). Although
this was a 2-1 decision upholding the denial of section 243(h) relief, all the members of the
court accepted the "well-founded fear" standard used by the Immigration Judge and the
BIA. Id. at 200, 204. See also, Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055, 1058 (2d Cir. 1976).
40 585 F.2d at 135.
41 In re McMullen, Interim Dec. No. 2831 at 4 (Oct. 1, 1980), rev'd on other grounds,
No. 80-7580 (9th Cir. Oct. 13, 1981) (discussed at 50 U.S.L.W. 2253 (1981)).
42 As amended, section 243(h) now reads:
(1) The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien (other than an alien
described in section 1251(a)(19) of this title) to a country if the Attorney General
determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country
Vol. 14:155
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Second, an alien may still present a claim of persecution, not by a foreign
government, but by an individual or organization in the country to which
the alien faces deportation. To succeed on such a claim, there must be "a
showing that the government in power is either unable or unwilling to
protect the alien.' 3 Presumably, the 'showing' must satisfy the restrictive
INS standards set forth above.
III. SOURCES AND SCOPE OF THE EVIDENCE
Judge James L. King, in the Haitian Refugee Center opinion, stated:
"No asylum claim can be examined without an understanding of the con-
ditions in the applicant's homeland. Similarly, the uniform rejection of
the claims of the present 5,000 member class cannot be reviewed, regard-
less how lenient the standard of review, without inquiring into the condi-
tions in Haiti."'4 This passage was followed by 36 pages of "Findings of
Fact: Conditions in Haiti". Included in these findings were discussions
about the treatment of returning refugees, conditions in Haitian prisons,
the power structure, the legal systems, politics, and social and economic
conditions in Haiti.45 Judge King failed to discuss, however, what level of
review of conditions in the applicant's homeland is necessary either in a
single INS deportation hearing, or even in a review of claims of a signifi-
cantly smaller class.
An examination of relevant court decisions and BIA opinions shows
that the decision-maker in these hypothesized situations must consider a
wide range of materials to determine the general conditions in the nation
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any alien if the Attorney General determines
that-
(A) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the perse-
cution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion;
(B) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly seri-
ous crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United States;
(C) There are serious reasons for considering that the alien has committed a
serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to the arrival of the
alien in the United States; or
(D) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the
security of the United States.
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, §203(e), 94 Stat. 107, (codified at 8 U.S.C.A.
§1253(h) (West Supp. 1981)). There is some disagreement over whether the Attorney Gen-
eral has ever refused to withhold deportation where an alien had made the proper showing.
See Coriolan, 559 F.2d 993, 997 n.7.
" McMullen, Interim Dec. No. 2831 at 5.
4 503 F. Supp. at 475.
" Id. at 449. See the Table of Contents of the opinion.
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to which the alien will be deported. The weight to be given the various
sources of information is largely left to the discretion of the individual
decision-maker. This broad discretion, however, renders useless any con-
clusions reached as a result of the review about general conditions in a
nation in the context of an individual decision.
An Immigration Judge, in evaluating a section 243(h) application for
deportation relief is bound to consider background evidence on conditions
in the applicant's country if evidence is offered by the INS or the appli-
cant.46 The leading decision on this issue, Coriolan,47 required reconsider-
ation of the petitioner's claims in light of an Amnesty International Re-
port on human rights conditions in Haiti. The Fifth Circuit stated: "[w]e
do not believe that the immigration authorities could properly decide an
alien's fate without taking note of conditions in the alien's country
.... "48 The court held that the report was "relevant to the broad-gauge
judgment of Haitian conditions which needs to be made."49
The INS has acceded to the standards and procedures desired by the
appellate courts in its decision to consider the totality of conditions in the
applicant's homeland. Indeed, in the Haitian Refugee Center litigation,
the District Director of the INS conceeded that he should consider the
general political and social conditions in Haiti when evaluating an asylum
application by a Haitian refugee.50 In more recent proceedings the BIA
held that an Amnesty International report "was clearly admissible as
background material regarding the conditions (or alleged conditions) in
the country to which the withholding claim was directed." 51
The policy of accepting information about background conditions
from a wide range of sources developed as a result of practical realities of
most section 243(h) claims for relief. The applicants themselves are often
"unlettered persons" who "typically have available to them no better
methods for ascertaining current political conditions abroad than does
the average American citizen .... -52 In fact, the applicant may be less
able to ascertain conditions in his native country than his U.S. counter-
4" Neither the courts nor the BIA have addressed whether background conditions must
be considered despite the absence of an offer of proof by the applicant.
47 559 F.2d 993.
48 Id. at 1002.
4 Id. (emphasis added).
80 503 F. Supp. at 472. But see Brief for Appellants at 52 (claiming that the trial court's
findings about general conditions in Haiti were gratuitous in the context of that litigation,
and should not be binding on the INS in the processing of Haitian applications for section
243(h) relief).
" Williams, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 701; see also In re Vardjan, 10 I. & N. Dec. 567, 573
(1964)(suggesting that the BIA would take a liberal stance on the admissibility of back-
ground information on conditions in the asylum claimant's home country).
82 Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d 21, 29 (2d Cir. 1963).
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part in that "the greater the likelihood of persecution in the foreign coun-
try, the less will be the possibility of obtaining information from relatives
or friends who are still there."53 It is also unrealistic to expect the appli-
cant to produce an expert on conditions in the foreign country," although
such experts have been found in certain cases.55
The obvious difficulty in requiring the applicant, the INS, or the De-
partment of Justice to provide information on general background condi-
tions in the applicant's native land have led several courts to take judicial
notice of these conditions,56 as was done in United States ex rel. Fong
Foo v. Shaughnessy," which was one of the first appellate court decisions
based on section 243(h). In this case, the petitioner had been ordered de-
ported to "Communist China." Claiming he would be subjected to physi-
cal persecution if forced to return, he requested a stay of the order. Com-
menting on the propriety of judicial notice in this situation, Judge Frank
wrote:
I think we can and should take judicial notice of the notorious and virtu-
ally indisputable fact-almost uniformly reported in all pertinent ac-
counts-of the ruthless behavior of the Communist governments in
China and Russia, so that almost surely a Chinese, known to have allied
himself with the Formosa Government, will be tortured and extermi-
nated if found on the mainland of China. Illegal entry into this country
should not be punished by death.
The Supreme Court has taken judicial notice of the date when the
yachting season ends in our northern waters. Surely the cruel habits of
the Chinese government are not less notorious. 58
Judicial notice of conditions in the homeland has been taken in cases
of Haitian nationals also. In United States ex rel. Mercer v. Esperdy,5 9
the district court declared that "the present regime in Haiti may well
represent a danger of physical persecution to persons such as [Mercer]." 60
The court's discussion of Haitian conditions cited extensively to the New
York Times. The court held that these accounts, "widely known and re-
ported in the press," were sufficient to justify a request to reopen the INS
8 Zamora, 534 F.2d at 1062.
"Id.
815 See Berdo v. INS, 432 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1970)(expert testified on conditions in Hun-
gary between 1955 and 1970).
" Not all courts believe they are in a proper position to engage in this sort of analysis.
See e.g., Coriolan, 559 F.2d at 1001-02 ("the evaluation of persecution claims involves the
evaluation of the political conditions of a nation-a task for which courts are not well-
suited").
' 234 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1955).
58 Id. at 718 (footnotes and citations omitted).
" 234 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
60 Id. at 616.
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hearing. 1
The INS used a similar approach to Haitian persecution claims
before it was deluged with the recent volume of asylum requests. The
BIA also invoked the judicial notice concept.62
Of course, if a court takes judicial notice of conditions in the appli-
cant's homeland which would qualify him for relief, the court may also
take judicial notice of factors which would disqualify him. For example,
the petitioners in Paul v. INS,6 3 claimed that the failure of the Immigra-
tion Judge to take judicial notice of conditions in Haiti was prejudicial to
their case. The court held that this failure did not deny them a fair hear-
ing, because "[mI]any Haitians seek refuge in this country, not for politi-
cal reasons, but for economic ones."64 The court based this finding on an
article in The New Yorker.
6 5
When a decision-maker takes judicial notice of conditions in a coun-
try, or accepts into evidence materials submitted by either side, the
source of information is almost unlimited. In recent cases, courts have
accepted statements from a local priest, 6 Amnesty International re-
ports,6 7 letters from the applicant's townspeople,' letters from the appli-
cant's relatives 9 (or the failure to receive the same),70 newspaper arti-
cles, 71 Congressional resolutions,7 2 Presidential messages,73 and books.7"
The BIA also follows this practice in its review of Immigration Judge de-
61 Id.
6, See, e.g., In re Joseph, 13 I. & N. Dec. 70, 72 (1968)(invoking the judicial notice
taken by the Court in United States ex rel. Mercer v. Esperdy, 234 F. Supp. 611); see also
Hyppolite v. INS, 382 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1967). In a 1966 deportation proceeding which in-
cluded a petition for section 243(h) relief, the special inquiry officer "took judicial notice of
the suppression of human rights and nonexistence of any rule of law under the current
government in Haiti." Id. at 100. The officer nonetheless found that the petitioner would
not be persecuted for her political opinions, a finding upheld by the BIA and the court.
63 521 F.2d 194.
64 Id. at 199. The court relied on Kovac, 407 F.2d 102, and held that given the large
number of economic refugees from Haiti, "[t]he suicide of one and attempted suicide of
another is not ... evidence of their fear or indicative that their fear is well-founded or
politically motivated." 521 F.2d at 201. A careful examination of the Kovac reference, how-
ever, reveals that the cited passage is irrelevant to the issue faced by the Paul court.
65 521 F.2d at 199 (citing Anderson, A Reporter at Large, the Haitians of New York,
NEW YORKER, Mar. 31, 1975, at 50).
66 Haitian Refugee Center, 503 F. Supp. at 518-19.
67 Coriolan, 559 F.2d 993.
68 Id.
69 Fleurionor, 585 F.2d 129.
'0 Zamora, 534 F.2d 1055.
71 Id.
71 Berdo, 432 F.2d 824.
73 Id.
11 Brief for Appellees at 45 n.27.
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cisions. Recent BIA opinions have dealt with Amnesty International re-
ports,7 15 newspaper articles e7 and a report by the International Commis-
sion of Jurists.71
Another obvious source of information on conditions in the appli-
cant's homeland is the U.S. Department of State. The current regulations
allow the INS to request information from the Bureau of Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA) of the State Department.7 8 Any re-
quest for political asylum made after the commencement of deportation
proceedings is treated as a request for relief under section 243(h) and
requires a BHRHA advisory opinion.7 9 Therefore, it seems likely in view
of the prior procedures and practice that the INS will seek the State De-
partment's views in most of these proceedings.
Under previous law, a request for asylum made by an alien at any
time before the completion of deportation proceedings, resulted in a stay
of the proceedings and a referral of the case to the INS District Direc-
tor.8 0 The District Director would "request the views of the Department
of State before making his decision unless ... the application is clearly
meritorious or clearly lacking in substance." 81 The Department of State
would then make a specific recommendation to the District Director
through its Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs (ORMA). If the Dis-
trict Director denies asylum, the alien could still request relief from de-
portation under INA section 243(h). As a result of this procedure, the
issue of the propriety of admitting the ORMA letter in the section 243(h)
proceeding arose.
The courts have dealt with the broader issue of the admissibility and
character of State Department information regarding general conditions
in the alien's homeland. ORMA letters were held admissible in Asghari v.
INS 82 on the grounds that the "advice came from a knowledgeable and
competent source," citing Hosseinmardi v. INS.83 The panel Hos-
11 McMullen, Interim Dec. No. 2831.
76 Id.
7 Williams, 16 I. & N. Dec. 697. The ICJ report was cited as compiled by "an inter-
national human rights organization." Id. at 701.
78 8 C.F.R. §208.7 (1981).
79 8 C.F.R. § 208.10 (1981).
80 8 C.F.R. §108.2 (1978). Regulations adopted in 1979 added section 108.3 which ap-
plies to asylum requests made after commencement of deportation proceedings. Part 108,
however, was removed after enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980. 46 Fed. Reg. 45,116
(1981). Asylum requests are processed currently under the procedures outlined in 8 C.F.R.
§ 208 (1981).
81 8 C.F.R. §108.2 (1978).
82 396 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1968).
83 Id. at 392. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Hosseinmardi v. INS was published in the
advance sheets of the Federal Reporter at 391 F.2d 914, but the court's opinion was with-
drawn before publication in the bound volume.
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seinmardi opinion was withdrawn, however, and did not reappear until
the denial of rehearing.8 4 Meanwhile, the same circuit, in deciding Kas-
ravi v. INS,"5 questioned the competency of ORMA letters, stating:
Such letters from the State Department do not carry the guarantees of
reliability which the law demands of admissible evidence. A frank, but
official, discussion of the political shortcomings of a friendly nation is not
always compatible with the high duty to maintain advantageous diplo-
matic relations with nations throughout the world. The traditional foun-
dation required of expert testimony is lacking, nor can official position be
said to supply an acceptable substitute. No hearing officer or court has
the means to know the diplomatic necessities of the moment, in the light
of which the statements must be weighed.8
In the per curiam decision on rehearing in Hosseinmardi, the major-
ity, after taking note of the above quoted statement in Kasravi, justified
the use of the ORMA letter in this case by noting that "The generalities
regarding conditions in [the foreign state] which appear in the letter were
severely challenged by petitioner's expert witnesses. It might well have
been improper had the Board given substantial weight to these generali-
ties without corroboration or further inquiry. '8 7
These Ninth Circuit cases indeed contain some very strong state-
ments against placing substantial weight upon information supplied by
the State Department. This position did not receive unanimous backing
on that circuit, however. The judge who authored the original opinion in
Hosseinmardi reiterated his belief in the admissibility of the ORMA let-
ter, 8 citing the Ninth Circuit's earlier decision in Namkung v. Boyd.s9
That decision upheld the admissibility of a letter from a foreign Consul
General, who was a diplomat from the same country from which the alien
Hosseinmardi v. INS, 405 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1969)(rehearing denied).
85 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968).
88 Id. at 677, n.1. The case concerned the deportation of an Iranian student. He offered
testimony, including two distinguished experts, on repressive conditions under the Shah.
The court noted that the "only evidence offered in opposition to Kasravi's position is rather
a perfunctory letter written by a State Department official concluding generally that an
Iranian student would not in all likelihood be persecuted for activities in the United
States." Id. at 676-77. The court denied the appeal, though, on the grounds that there was
no abuse of the Attorney General's discretion. Id. at 677-78.
87 405 F.2d at 28.
88 Id. (Byrne, J., concurring).
; 226 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1955). This case is also cited in the Kasravi opinion, 400 F.2d
at 677. It is interesting to note that the Namkung court was adopting the rule set out by the
Second Circuit in, United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392, 394 (2d Cir.
1953), that "the very nature of the decision [the Attorney General] must make [in a section
243(h) decision] concerning what the foreign country is likely to do is a political issue into
which the courts should not intrude." Id. at 395. The Second Circuit no longer adheres to
such a narrow standard in reviewing decision under section 243(h) claims.
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was resisting deportation.90
The Fifth Circuit took a position on the admissibility of ORMA let-
ters in Paul v. INS.91 In that case the letter was shown to be totally unre-
sponsive to the plaintiffs claims.92 Since the letter had not influenced the
Immigration Judge or the BIA, the court, citing the Hosseinmardi rehear-
ing opinion, held it was unnecessary to consider the alien's arguments on
the issue.9
3
The dissent in Paul was correct in arguing that the alien's arguments
should have been addressed. With respect to the ORMA letter, the BIA
held that "the Immigration Judge properly relied on this evidence. The
advice came from a reliable, knowledgeable and competent source [cita-
tions omitted]. '94 The dissent notes that "regardless of how good the
source, the report was wrong." 95 While this characterization of the factual
situation in Paul is accurate, it allows one to infer that ORMA letters
would be admissible only if "accurate." A more satisfactory solution
would have been for the dissent to follow up on the majority's citation to
Hosseinmardi.
The compromise position on the admissibility of State Department
information was reached by the Second Circuit in Zamora v. INS." Rec-
ognizing the need for background information on conditions in a foreign
nation, yet realizing the possibility that the State Department might be
"tempering the wind in comments concerning internal affairs of a foreign
nation, ' 97 the court held admissible:
statements of the Department of State or its officials abroad which in-
form the I[mmigration] J[udge] and the [BIA] of the extent to which the
nation of prospective deportation engages in 'persecution . . .' of the
class of persons to whom [sic] an applicant under [243(h)] claims to be-
long, and reveal, so far as feasible, the basis for the views expressed, but
do not attempt to apply this knowledge to the particular case .... 98
This "compromise" is still in effect.
Allowing the INS to introduce these statements concerning general
conditions in the alien's home country prepared by the State Depart-
90 226 F.2d 385.
91 521 F.2d 194.
92 Id. at 200. Not only was the letter unresponsive to plaintiff's claims, it was factually
incorrect. Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 205 (Godbold, J., dissenting)(quoting the BIA decision).
95 Id. (Godbold, J., dissenting).
96 534 F.2d 1055.
7 Id. at 1062. The court noted that this difficulty could be mitigated by admitting such
evidence, but not entering it on the record. Id. See 8 C.F.R. §242.17(c)(1981) which provides
for receipt of "non-record" information.
98 534 F.2d at 1062.
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ment, however, greatly exacerbates the alien's burden in establishing eli-
gibility for relief. For example, in In re Williams,9 the INS introduced a
1978 letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Refugee and Migra-
tion Affairs written to the INS District Director in Miami. The letter
quoted from a March 1977 State Department document that the "more
extreme charges of human rights abuse described in the 1976 Amnesty
International Report [were] basically dated, being more descriptive of
conditions as they were at times in the 1960's in Haiti. . . ."10 The Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary also stated in the letter that the "Embassy in
Port-au-Prince ha[d] reported that to the best of its knowledge the Hai-
tian government had not in recent years punished returning nationals be-
cause they may have left the country without proper documentation." 10 1
The BIA, as one might expect, found the State Department material
quite credible and probative. It did not even discuss the possible weak-
nesses inherent in such evidence which were noted in the circuit court
opinions of Kasravi, Hosseinmardi, and Zamora.'° ' The decision in Wil-
liams was typical of BIA decisionmaking in this context.'
While the Immigration Judges and the BIA readily believe and apply
general State Department background information to the individual
claimant, they carefully scrutinize general information obtained from
other sources. 04 Thus, an alien who wishes to support his claim with an
9 16 I. & N. Dec. 697.
o00 Id. at 702.
101 Id. The government in Haitian Refugee Center relied on a State Department study
concluding that Haitian returnees were not being persecuted, 503 F. Supp. at 482. In analyz-
ing the due process claims, Judge King devoted twelve pages to an examination of the State
Department study. He considered the composition of the study team, the statistical sample,
the interviews, and assurances made to the interviewers. Id. at 482-93. It is difficult to imag-
ine a similarly detailed, in-depth analysis occurring in an individual case. For example, in
Williams the BIA simply concluded: "We find this evidence significantly more credible and
probative regarding the current treatment of returning Haitian nationals by the government
of that country than the information and allegations reflected in the 1976 Amnesty Interna-
tional Report." 16 I. & N. Dec. at 703.
102 Williams, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 703. The BIA held it was not reversible error for the
Immigration Judge to make the "overstatement" that "Haitians leave their country not be-
cause of political conditions, but because of economic conditions." Id.
os See Haitian Refugee Center, 503 F. Supp. 442; Coriolon, 559 F.2d 993; Zamora, 534
F.2d 1055; Paul, 521 F.2d 195; In re Chumpitazi, 16 I. & N. Dec. 629 (1978)(admitting a
letter from the Vice Counsul of the nation to which the alien would be deported); In re
Cenatice, 16 I. & N. Dec. 162 (1977); In re Francois, 15 I. & N. Dec. 534 (1975); In re
Chukumerije, 15 I. & N. Dec. 520 (1975). But cf. In re Smith, 16 I. & N. Dec. 146 (1977). In
Smith the State Department allowed the Ethiopian national to remain in the United States
for 12 to 18 months. Two months later, the District Director wrote back asking for a more
definitive statement on Smith's eligibility for refugee status. The Department of State re-
sponded by deciding that a "reasonable case" for granting asylum had not been made out.
The District Director ultimately denied asylum.
'0 So obvious that it barely merits mention is the fact that State Department informa-
Vol. 14:155
POLITICAL ASYLUM?
Amnesty International report, for example, will probably find the deci-
sion-maker unpersuaded. A typical example of this attitude appears in
the opinion in Fleurinor:
We have read the Amnesty International Report, and while we are re-
pulsed by the wholesale disregard of fundamental human rights by Jean
Claude (Baby Doc) Duvalier's government, we do not see how the Report
adds anything to Fleurinor's claim that he will be subject to persecution
upon his return to Haiti.105
The BIA has recently voiced a similar conclusion in considering evi-
dence submitted by an alien, a member of the Provisional Irish Republi-
can Army, who claimed persecution if deported to Ireland.
We do not give much weight to those articles submitted by the respon-
dent which are of a general nature and do not in any way relate to the
respondent himself. Such evidence is not probative on the issue of the
likelihood of this alien being subject to persecution if deported .... 10
Consequently, unless the alien can produce official documents or a
qualified expert to testify to the likelihood that the individual will be sub-
ject to persecution,10 7 the only evidence left for the Immigration Judge or
BIA to balance against the State Department materials is the statement
of the alien himself, and possibly the statement of a relative. The chance
of obtaining relief in this situation is obviously remote.108
The court has intimated, however, that if the totality of conditions is
sufficiently oppressive as demonstrated by the general evidence, a more
benign view will be taken of an alien's petition for relief.10 9 That is, the
tion usually works against relief. That from other sources usually works for it.
105 585 F.2d at 133 (emphasis in the original).
120 McMullen, Interim Dec. No. 2831 at 7.
'0 Being able to produce such an expert is no guarantee of obtaining relief from either
the Immigration Judge or the BIA. See Berdo, 432 F.2d 824.
108 McMullen, Interim Dec. No. 2831. "There is no evidence in the record, other than
the respondent's own statements, to show ... he would be mistreated or subject to undue
coercion. The respondent has failed to meet his burden of establishing that he would be
persecuted... if deported ... ." Id. at 8. See also Henry v. INS, 552 F.2d 130 (5th Cir.
1977). "Petitioners, however, supported this allegation only by conclusory statements from
personal knowledge. . . ." Id. at 131. Cf. Hyppolite, 382 F.2d 98 (finding that there was no
evidence that the alien would be persecuted for her political opinions, despite testimony of
advice from relatives and friends implying the contrary).
109 A court may consider a variety of factors including rule of law, existence of torture,
and functioning press, to determine the oppressiveness of the totality of conditions. A re-
view of the cases leads one to the cynical conclusion, however, that conditions of Communist
nations are assumed to be horrendous while those of our allies are not closely examined.
Compare Berdo, 432 F.2d 824 (Hungarian claimant fleeing Communist domination) with
Asghari, 396 F.2d 391 (Iranian student seeking asylum).
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general evidence may not have to be specifically related to the alien.11 0
This is the "intimation" which pervades the Haitian Refugee Center
opinion.
Building on the premise that the general conditions in the alien's na-
tion must be examined, Judge King gave strong consideration to reports
by the State Department and others which described Haiti as "the most
ruthless and oppressive regime" in the hemisphere.,", This enabled the
court to conclude that: "The treatment of returnees in Haiti is part of a
systematic and pervasive oppression of political opposition which uses
prisons as its torture chambers and 'Tonton Macoutes' as its
enforcers.""' 2
Judge King's approach in Haitian Refugee Center had been devel-
oped in earlier cases such as Coriolan. In that case, the appeals court held
that with "the presentation of the Amnesty International report, petition-
ers have clearly placed in issue the question of whether Haitian political
conditions are so specially oppressive that a wider range of claims of per-
secution must be given credence.""13 As a result, the court remanded the
case and ordered the Amnesty International Report received. Yet, a year
later, when the same circuit was faced with another case involving almost
identical facts, it held the Amnesty International Report not "material"
and refused to overturn the denial of relief.'1 4 Thus, in the context of the
individual hearing, unless the evidence is derived from the State Depart-
ment, the Immigration Judge or the BIA may still require general evi-
dence to be specifically related to the individual alien. Therefore, the net
effect of permitting the Immigration Judge and BIA to examine evidence
on the general conditions in the alien's homeland is to give disproportion-
ate weight to State Department opinions, and augment the burden placed
on the alien seeking 243(h) relief.
IV. SPECIFIC FACT PATTERNS
An examination of the recent decisions on Haitian requests for sec-
110 This appears to be the only position reconcilable with the practice of taking judicial
notice of general conditions in the country. When the oppressive conditions are shown with
demonstrable evidence the force of this argument becomes even stronger.
111 Haitian Refugee Center, 503 F. Supp. at 475, 503.
112 Id. at 475.
11 559 F.2d at 1063.
14 Fleurinor, 585 F.2d at 133. In order to remand for new evidence, the evidence must
be material and there must exist reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce the evidence
before the agency. 28 U.S.C. §2347(c)(1976). The court held that neither test was satisfied.
"In order for evidence to be 'material' within the meaning of section 2347(c), the evidence
must be probative on the issue of the likelihood of this alien being subject to persecution in
the event of deportation." 585 F.2d at 133 (emphasis in the original). The court thus eviscer-
ated the Coriolan holding.
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tion 243(h) relief reveals that the INS and reviewing courts consider a
strikingly narrow list of factors. Perhaps the single most determinative
factor influencing a political asylum decision in the view of the INS is the
alien's membership in a political organization or participation in a politi-
cal activity not sanctioned by the State. Immigration Judge Opinions and
BIA reports denying alien asylum claims often contain a passage which
reads: "nothing in the record suggests any past or present political activ-
ity or affiliations on the part of [the alien] or his Haitian family that
might form the basis of a fear of persecution."' 1 5 It is almost impossible
to over-emphasize the ethnocentric gloss placed by the INS upon the con-
cept of "political opinion."' 1 6
A second factor which has a strong impact on the INS is aliens' treat-
ment while residing in the homeland, or during a return visit. The Immi-
gration Judge inquires whether the alien was arrested, imprisoned, or
harassed by the governmental authorities." 7 One might cynically con-
clude that if a refugee successfully evades physical abuse, he will have a
difficult time demonstrating his need for relief.
A third factor considered crucial by the INS is the treatment re-
ceived by the alien's friends and family in the homeland, in light of the
alien's alleged political activity, or request for asylum. The inability to
show that one's relatives are being harassed, arrested, or imprisoned seri-
ously undermines the claim for relief." 8
Two other factors also seem to be somewhat important in accessing
the probability of proving political persecution. First, the INS will readily
consider whether the alien had any formal ties to the State's official appa-
ratus, for example, whether the alien was a government or military em-
ployee. 1 9 Proof of such ties constitutes a vehicle toward the award of re-
lief, but, admittedly, this argument will be available to few Haitian
refugees. The second and more time-conscious consideration inquires
when the alien was politically active or subject to persecution. The more
remote the underlying political activity, the less likely the chances of ob-
'15 Henry, 552 F.2d at 131; see Coriolan, 559 F.2d at 998, 1005; Martineau, 556 F.2d at
307; Gena, 424 F.2d at 233; Williams, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 700; Francois, 15 I. & N. Dec. at
538-39.
116 See Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1125,
1139-47 (1980).
11" See Coriolan, 559 F.2d at 998, 1005; Henry, 552 F.2d at 131; Paul, 521 F.2d at 203;
Gena, 424 F.2d at 233; Hyppolite, 382 F.2d at 98; Williams, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 700.
11H See Fleurinor, 585 F.2d at 134 ("family remains unmolested by the Duvalier re-
gime"); Coriolan, 559 F.2d at 998, 1005; Zamora, 534 F.2d at 1059 (alien's children resided
in Haiti); Paul, 521 F.2d at 203 (dissent would grant relief because relatives were molested);
Gena, 424 F.2d at 233 (alien's wife, children, brothers, and sisters continued to reside in
Haiti); Williams, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 700 (alien "made no claim that repercussions resulted to
her family in Haiti because of her opinions, her actions, or her departure ..
"' See Coriolan, 559 F.2d at 998, 1005; Martineau, 556 F.2d at 307.
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taining relief. The INS assumes that political actions taken by or political
persecution visited upon the alien more than six to eight years prior to
the asylum claim will not support a well-founded fear of persecution.1 20
The Immigration Judge or the BIA will simply find that: "Nothing
presented establishes that the [home government] . . . now is aware of
respondents or has any interest, any adverse interest, in them. 1 21 When
the INS passes judgment on this basis, it generally does not undertake a
complete appraisal of conditions in the alien's country.
As mentioned above,1 22 some courts have suggested that if conditions
reach a certain level of intolerable oppression, a broader conception of
"political opposition" should be employed. This suggestion related di-
rectly to the prime consideration of the INS: membership in a political
organization or participation in a political activity not sanctioned by the
State.123 This expanded framework for analyzing an alien's claim is not
contrary to the current INS criteria, but rather interprets the elements of
that criteria more broadly.
The Fifth Circuit opinion in Coriolan1" is an example of this expan-
sion. The Immigration Judge had considered the alien's request for relief
by examining only the standard items enumerated above. The court held
that in the Haitian context, it may be necessary to take a broader view of
the alien's claims. 25 Concerning the INS' views of Haitian political condi-
tions, the court stated:
Many-though certainly not all-of the factual conclusions of the [immi-
gration] judge suggest unstated assumptions about the nature of Haitian
political life. For example, his opinion observed that there was no evi-
dence that [the aliens] had ever belonged to any political organizations in
Haiti. Similarly, the judge was not convinced that their political opinions
differed from those of the vast majority of Haitians. These observations
imply a premise: that people without overt political activity, or minority
political opinions, are unlikely to be the victims of political persecution.
Solid as it sounds, this proposition is not graven in stone. It may be,
in fact, that Haitian citizens can become the focus of government perse-
cution without ever taking any conventionally "political" action at all.1' 6
120 See Fleurinor, 585 F.2d at 134 (events 8 years ago); Zamora, 534 F.2d at 1058
(events 6 years ago); Williams, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 698 (events 8 years ago, but alien did not
leave until 18 months after the events); Francois, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 538-39 (father murdered
15 years ago and step-father murdered 7 years ago).
121 Zamora, 534 F.2d at 1058.
2I See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
122 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
124 559 F.2d 993.
12 Id. at 1003-04.
16 Id. at 1000-01. The court also noted,
[i]t could be argued that although [the aliens] are likely victims of govern-
ment persecution, what they face is not persecution for their "political
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If the Haitian national can convince the Immigration Judge, BIA, or
appeals court to adopt this broader perspective in considering his claim
for section 243(h) relief, he has at his disposal a potentially very strong
argument. Illegal department alone12 7 may constitute sufficient "political"
activity to pose a threat to one's life or freedom if deported.
This argument is frequently invoked on behalf of "escapees" from
Communist countries. The INS, indeed the U.S. government and most of
its citizenry, often lauds the bravery of individuals endeavoring to extri-
cate themselves from "Communist domination." Such acts are considered
political statements by their very nature.128 When the homeland, like Ha-
iti, is an American ally, however, the alien's position is much more
tenuous.
A Fifth Circuit panel, in Henry,"19 was the first court to be receptive
to this argument on behalf of a Haitian. The court reviewed the denial of
section 243(h) relief under a "narrow mandate" for arbitrariness or abuse
of discretion. It first noted that the aliens had failed to show that they
specifically had reason to fear persecution in Haiti, according to the stan-
dard checklist of items. As regards the allegations by the aliens that any-
one who left the regime of "Papa Doc" Duvalier, as they had in 1958,
would be received with hostility by the "Baby Doc" government, the
court acknowledged its relevance' 30 but held that the aliens had not
proven it by "a preponderance of the evidence. ' '
The same circuit, in Coriolan, while not reaching the factual problem
of applying the argument to Haiti, made clear its view that if illegal de-
parture was punishable for political reasons, the alien would qualify for a
stay of deportation under section 243(h).13 2
Thus, the stage was set for the Haitian Refugee Center opinion. The
court examined the general conditions in the alien's homeland and found
the conditions characteristic of a brutal "tyranny." As a consequence, the
opinion" as the statute requires. We cannot believe, however, that Congress
would have refused sanctuary to people whose misfortune it was to be the
victims of a government which did not require political activity or opinion
to trigger its oppression.
Id. at 1004.
Under this analysis, if we assume a mythical government which once a month selected
one person from each town to be publicly executed, as a means of ensuring a docile popu-
lace, one who found out in advance his or her execution date, and who came to the United
States, should be granted asylum.
M" See supra note 9 regarding the scope of this paper.
128 See Berdo, 432 F.2d 824 at 833, 845; cf. Kovac, 407 F.2d 102.
:29 552 F.2d 130.
130 The court stated: [i]f proved, such an allegation might form a sound basis for fear of
persecution regardless of the placidity of an individual's political past. Id. at 131.
131 Id. at 132.
112 559 F.2d at 1000.
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traditional indicators of political opinion lost their impact, and a more
general examination of the alien's probable predicament if deportation
was required. The court concluded that illegal departure and a plea for
asylum may be sufficient to provoke persecution by the Haitian regime.
To the [State Department Study] Team, only the intellectuals and the
leaders of political parties would be .. .classified [as participants in
"political resistance"]. The fallacy of this presumption is abundantly
clear. The uncontradicted evidence at trial, evidence which the State De-
partment has often recognized, demonstrates that the "political opposi-
tion" is quite broadly defined. Moreover, the Team's conclusion fails to
consider the possibility that the claim of asylum itself may cause one to
be classified among the political opposition. The Haitian government
conceded that an asylum claim may be regarded as defamation of the
nation. The evidence is clear that returnees are regarded as traitors, and
that asylum claims are regarded as an insult to the Duvalier
government.
13 3
Although the Haitian Refugee Center litigation is still on appeal, the
INS has begun to prepare itself for whatever decision the Appeals Court
might reach on review. In In re Williams, decided shortly after the Hai-
tian Refugee Center class-action litigation was filed,"' the alien ex-
pressed fear that she would be killed if deported as the Haitian govern-
ment knew of her request for asylum. The BIA responded by citing a
State Department letter indicating that to the best of its knowledge, the
Haitian government had not punished returning nationals in recent years.
The letter suggested that the Haitian government "unofficially recog-
nized" the economic benefits of the illegal departures."3 ' In support of its
position, the State Department noted three* instances of follow-up in-
quiries finding no persecution of returnees. Furthermore, after reviewing
175 cases, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had con-
cluded that "merely departing Haiti and requesting political asylum in
the United States [was] insufficient grounds to establish a prima facie
claim to such asylum." 3" All of the points raised in the State Depart-
ment's letter have been rebutted.1 3 7 Notwithstanding, the basic problem
remains: the INS is not inclined to grant section 243(h) relief to Haitian
nationals. It is unwilling to accept the argument that Haiti is an oppres-
,33 503 F. Supp. at 480. As previously observed, the Haitian Refugee Center litigation
did not involve the review of specific claims. Thus, the problems involved in determining the
likelihood of an individual being persecuted (or, seen another way, the probability of all
being persecuted) were not resolved.
134 Williams was decided on March 30, 1979 by the BIA. 16 I. & N. Dec. 697. The
original complaint leading to the Haitian Refugee Center decision was filed on May 9, 1979.
135 16 I. & N. Dec. at 702.
136 Id. (quoting a State Department letter to Congressman Fraser).
'"7 See Haitian Refugee Center, 503 F. Supp. 442; Brief for Appellees at 10-11, 67.
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sive and totalitarian regime such that merely fleeing the country and
"embarassing" it abroad with a request for political asylum may subject
one to persecution.3 8
V. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Until the Refugee Act of 1980 amended section 243(h), the granting
of relief under that provision was a discretionary act of the Attorney Gen-
eral.1 39 As such, the review of the Attorney General's decision, as made by
the Immigration Judge and BIA, was very restricted. As stated by the
court in Fleurinor:
Our authority to review the determination of petitioner's failure to meet
his burden of proof is limited: "Judicial review of discretionary adminis-
trative action is limited to the questions of whether the applicant has
been accorded procedural due process and whether the decision has been
reached in accordance with the applicable rules of law. Furthermore, the
inquiry goes to the question whether or not there has been an exercise of
administrative discretion and, if so, whether the manner of exercise has
been arbitrary or capricious. 140
It is in the context of this deferential standard of judicial review that
one should consider the courts' affirmances of INS determinations deny-
ing relief on grounds of insufficient facts. While the court's examination
of decisions on persecution claims is not altogether perfunctory in these
cases, it is clear that no searching review was contemplated or under-
taken. Particularly salient is the Henry 411 decision where the aliens al-
leged that anyone who had fled from the "Papa Doc" regime would be
persecuted under "Baby Doc" upon return to Haiti. Noting its "narrow
mandate," and applying the standard of review quoted above, the court
characterized the alien's evidence as "conclusory statements from per-
sonal knowledge and unauthenticated reports purporting to describe the
Haitian political atmosphere."1 42 The Immigration Judge and BIA deci-
sion were affirmed, "because a fair and reasonable assessment of the re-
cord fail[ed] to disclose that its decision was arbitrary, capricious or an
abuse of discretion. '143 It can be assumed that the aliens had not proved
their allegations. This is not to say that no significant or substantial evi-
dence existed on the record to support the alien's contention. In conclud-
ing merely that the evidence was insufficient, perhaps the court is expres-
138 See Haitian Refugee Center, 503 F. Supp. at 507.
119 See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
10 585 F.2d at 133 (quoting Henry, 552 F.2d at 131).
141 552 F.2d 130.
:1 Id. at 131-32.
43 Id. at 132.
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sing a. willingness to accept alien claims and to be somewhat less
deferential to the BIA, and the INS.
The Second Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have pioneered the argu-
ment that the facts forming the basis for the Attorney General's decision,
although subject to administrative discretion, must be supported by sub-
stantial evidence. 144 They held that "the determination of whether or not
persecution, within the meaning of section 243(h), would actually occur in
the event of deportation was a finding of fact-distinct from the exercise
of administrative discretion to stay deportation-and had to pass the
substantial evidence test. ' 145 The 1980 Refugee Act amendment removed
the Attorney General's discretion in this matter. As the theory of the Sec-
ond Circuit becomes more viable,""6 future findings of fact under section
243(h) may have to pass the substantial evidence test upon review. If that
is the case, more court decisions requiring the Attorney General to with-
hold deportation under section 243(h) may soon follow. 4"
VI. SUMMARY
This note has attempted to examine the problems of relating the dis-
trict court opinion in Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti to an individual
asylum application, when seeking or granting relief under the recently
amended section 243(h). It has been observed that the INS continues to
adhere to as strict an interpretation of this section as possible, despite the
trend toward liberalization in appellate court opinions. While many
sources of evidence of general homeland conditions are now admissible in
deportation-withholding proceedings, the admissibility of this evidence
does not often result in successful claims for relief. A few courts have
stated that in an extreme situation "political opposition" should be
broadly interpreted. The INS, however, has refused to follow this sugges-
tion in deciding individual Haitian claims. Whether the appellate courts
will uphold the INS position in light of the amendment to section 243(h)
is a question which can be answered only by future decisions.
4' See United States ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1967)
cert. denied 392 U.S. 935 (1968); Wing Wong v. INS, 360 F.2d 715, 717 (2d Cir. 1966);
Hamad v. INS, 420 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1969); cf. Zamora, 534 F.2d at 1060.
145 Zamora, 534 F.2d at 1060.
,46 See McMullen v. INS, No. 80-7580 (9th Cir. Oct. 13, 1981) (discussed at 50
U.S.L.W. 2253 (1981))(adopting the "substantial evidence" test in light of the Refugee Act
of 1980 amendment to section 243(h)).
147 The issues raised in Haitian Refugee Center occurred before the passage of the Act
and, hence, the plaintiffs did not come within its scope. See Haitian Refugee Center, 503 F.
Supp. 453.
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